INTRODUCTION
The November 1994 elections reignited interest in many fundamental issues. The assignment of functional roles to local, state, and federal governments, the appropriate balance between the public and private sectors, and the types of grants provided by the federal government all could be significantly altered. As this is written in early 1996, it is not clear whether major policy changes will be enacted before the November elections, but the probability appears to be high that federal policies will be significantly altered no later than 1997. This paper addresses the implications of these developments for the country and for public finance research. In terms of research needs, it is concerned with two primary questions: How can research be improved so that it is better able to explain the policy choices that state and local governments are making? What can be done to make research more useful to state policy makers?
THE CONTENT OF THE DEVOLUTION REVOLUTION 1
Devolution refers to passing responsibility down to another level of government. It is difficult to discuss for several reasons. First, it is inherently complicated, with numerous important effects on states and citizens and major differences in how various states will be affected. Second, as the cliche says, the devil is in the details. Some approaches to reducing federal aid and increasing state flexibility have very different effects than others. Third, the welfare and Medicaid systems would be fundamentally altered, confronting state governments with new choices. There is enormous uncertainty about how they would respond. Fourth, the time horizon matters: the short-run effects of devolution are likely to differ considerably from the long-run effects.
The New Federalism embodied in the Republican revolution has three major aspects affecting state and local governments. (1) They would receive less federal aid. (2) Some of the most important aid programs would be changed from matching to nonmatching grants. (3) States would have more flexibility in operating programs. A major uncertainty is the size of the aid reductions in relation to the benefits from increased flexibility.
Aid Reductions
The driving force in reducing aid is the effort to balance the federal budget by the year 2002. Aid to states will bear a disproportionate share of the spending reductions needed to balance the budget because the three largest spending categories-Social Security, defense, and interest payments-are likely to be cut relatively little if at all. In the reconciliation bill vetoed by the president in late 1995, aid would have been reduced approximately 26 percent in 2002.
2 If there is a budget agreement, the eventual aid reduction will probably be less than 26 percent because the federal tax reduction will be smaller and more optimistic economic assumptions have reduced the prospective deficit in 2002. But the aid reduction would still be substantial, probably on the order of 15-20 percent.
This projected reduction is from what aid would have been under current federal law. In nominal dollars, the total amount of aid would increase. It is important, however, to disaggregate aid. The entire nominal increase between 1995-2002 is attributable to Medicaid, which accounted for about 40 percent of total aid in 1995. Excluding Medicaid, aid would fall in nominal dollars. It should also be recognized that the baseline from which the aid reductions are calculated does not reflect the impact of inflation on discretionary programs in some years.
Federal aid represents between a quarter and a third of state government resources.
3 A 15-20 percent reduction from what aid would have been in 2002 implies that, other things being equal, state revenues will be about five percent lower than they would have been in that year. Spreading this reduction over seven years, we can say that total revenues will grow about 0.7 percent less per year than they otherwise would have.
Whether states can absorb this reduction without having to reduce services or increase revenues depends on how fast current services spending and revenue are growing. If the growth rate of revenue were at least 0.7 percent higher than the growth rate of spending, states could adjust to the loss of federal aid without having to cut back spending or raise taxes and fees. However, it appears that most states are not so fortunate. Indeed, many seem to have structural deficits. (A common strategy for states has been to shift their fiscal problems, such as by relying increasingly on tuition to fund higher education, cutting back on aid to schools and other local governments, and pushing costs into the future. Each of these shifts represents a failure to maintain current services).
This does not imply that states face an immediate fiscal catastrophe. In fact, aid reductions will be gradually phased in, so they will not be particularly dramatic at first but rather will grow steadily over time. Besides, many states have accumulated substantial reserve balances that can provide a cushion to help them absorb aid cutbacks at first. But those balances represent nonrecurring revenue, and they would disappear fast if a recession occurred.
Some observers may discount long-term projections in the belief that policies would probably be changed before 2002, resulting in smaller cutbacks. Whether that assumption is accurate depends, in part, on whether a constituNational Tax Journal Vol 49 no. 2 (June 1996) pp. 273-87 1 2 1 2 tional amendment to require a balanced federal budget is adopted. If it were, it would be much more difficult to avoid large aid reductions in the out-years.
Another imponderable is how well the economy performs. The federal government's projections assume that eliminating the deficit would raise the growth rate of the economy. If that occurred, it would help states in two ways-federal aid reductions would not have to be as large because the federal deficit would be smaller, and state tax revenue would grow more. Assumptions about stronger economic growth rate (and the positive effect of deficit reduction on the level of interest rates) are, however, extremely uncertain.
Shift from Matching to Nonmatching Grants
At least as important as the amount of grants is their form. By proposing a shift from open-ended matching grants to block grants for Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and some smaller programs, the reforms incorporated in the budget reconciliation act would have significantly decreased the incentive for states to spend their own money on the affected programs. Since 1965, the federal government has paid from 50-83 percent of the cost of Medicaid and AFDC, so it cost states only 17-50 cents to increase their spending for those programs by a dollar. Under block grants, it would cost a dollar for states to spend a dollar. 4 Thus, the devolution revolution would reduce not only federal spending but also state spending. It is really a prescription for lower government spending.
The virtual abandonment of openended matching grants 5 is inconsistent with the view that such grants are needed to stimulate the production of services that produce external benefits. It appears that the externality argument for welfare and Medicaid spending is being rejected. People seem not to accept the idea any longer that there are production externalities-for example, that poverty breeds crime and that welfare tends to reduce it. At the same time, belief in consumption externalities appears to be waning-the idea that one person's welfare is affected adversely if others are in poverty.
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Another important implication of adopting block grants is that the amount of financial aid provided by the federal government to states will not automatically respond during a recession. States usually experience serious fiscal problems when the economy contracts, because tax revenue is depressed and the caseloads of programs such as Medicaid and welfare grow substantially. During the most recent recession these developments were partially offset by a large increase in federal aid. Between 1990-1992, state spending rose 20.4 percent while state tax revenue was growing only 9.1 percent. A 34.3 percent federal aid increase made it much easier for states to avoid deficits or painful spending reductions and tax increases (Gold, 1995a) . Although some Congressional proposals include contingency funds to augment certain block grants if unemployment rises sharply, states would not enjoy a large increase in federal aid during the next recession as they have in the past.
The automatic growth of federal aid caused by the recession of the early 1990s suggests that the full implications of switching to block grants will really not be felt until the next recession occurs. Eliminating open-ended match-3 ing grants means that the state budget crunch will be much more severe during a recession than it has been during the downturns of the past several decades.
On the other hand, the federal deficit will not increase as much in recessions as it has done in the past. There is, however, not perfect symmetry. States cannot run up big deficits as the federal government can. Their efforts to stave off deficits will tend to destabilize the national economy. 
Enhanced Flexibility
The New Federalism would give states the freedom to redesign programs in more efficient and effective ways, but the quantitative magnitude of the benefits from increased flexibility is uncertain. The advantages gained by reducing paperwork are probably not worth a great deal in comparison with the loss of funding that is associated with the block grants, 8 but the relaxation of regulations could be more significant. Freedom from the voluminous rules governing how programs must be operated could yield substantial efficiency gains, particularly if the federal government has been prescribing standards that are higher than local citizens desire. Advocates of devolution point to the results of welfare and Medicaid waivers as indications of the kind of changes that will occur. For example, Oregon and Tennessee used waivers to substantially expand Medicaid coverage, and Wisconsin was able to significantly reduce welfare caseloads in two counties.
The gains from enhanced flexibility depend on how creative the states are and how sweeping the block grant legislation turns out to be. Some of the freedom that state officials seek involves allowing them to reduce their own spending, to cut off beneficiaries of programs, to reduce service standards, or to shift costs to others (e.g., by repealing the Boren Amendment that has forced states to pay higher rates to hospitals and nursing homes than they otherwise would have). Such provisions help states fiscally but do not necessarily make programs more efficient.
Historical Perspective
The New Federalism rolls back the clock in some ways to before the Great Society and in other respects to before the New Deal. By fundamentally changing Medicaid, it affects one of the major legacies of the Great Society. By abolishing AFDC, it undoes a guarantee that was established as part of the New Deal.
But while the New Federalism would fundamentally change the form of those programs, it does not come anywhere near returning us to where we used to be in terms of the amount of aid provided. Federal aid is currently 3.2 percent of GDP. That is less than the peak level of 3.6 percent in the late 1970s, but it is higher than in any year before 1973. The comparable figure in 1965 was 1.9 percent, and in 1940, 0.9 percent.
If federal aid were cut 20 percent from its 1995 level, it would be no lower than it was in 1992. After falling in the early 1980s and growing relatively slowly through most of the remainder of that decade, the amount of aid began to rise rapidly in 1989. Just four years later it had grown from $124 billion to $194 billion. Most of this increase occurred automatically, without explicit initiatives from the federal government. As explained above, much of it reflected the recession that led to surging demand for social services (defined National Tax Journal Vol 49 no. 2 (June 1996) pp. 273-87 broadly to include health, income security, and direct services). Another part was caused by spending increases related to new federal mandates. But part also was the result of state actions that shifted costs to the federal government, particularly for Medicaid.
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De Facto Devolution
As this is written in early 1996, the stalemate between the president and Congress has brought a halt to what once seemed an irresistible march toward block grants and adoption of a balanced budget plan. Nevertheless, it appears very likely that much of the devolution agenda will continue to advance.
Two points can be made. First, many states already have waivers permitting them to escape from a large number of the federal regulations that have governed welfare and Medicaid programs, and the administration appears ready to approve more waivers liberally. The end of "welfare as we know it" is already occurring, with 37 states having welfare waivers of some kind (varying from far reaching to minor). The same thing is happening to Medicaid.
Second, momentum toward reducing the federal budget deficit appears likely to continue. If it does, aid to states will be curtailed, probably resulting in a reduction of the proportion of state revenue coming from the federal government. This amounts to de facto devolution, although it will occur more gradually than if it were compressed into seven years.
Whether a big budget agreement is reached in 1996 or 1997, the federal system appears likely to change fundamentally. The issues are how fast it changes and how it changes.
WHAT IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE RESEARCH
If the New Federalism is actually enacted, it will eventually stimulate considerable research by specialists in public finance and public policy. A thorough discussion of the pitfalls and priorities for such research would consider such issues as how welfare and Medicaid reform affected work effort, family structure, the nonmarital birth rate, and access to health care. This review will focus on a narrower set of issues, those dealing with state tax and spending policies.
Unfortunately, unless major changes are made in how public finance research is conducted, it is likely that a large portion of that research will fail to recognize critical features of the state fiscal landscape. This will significantly impair its usefulness.
It would exceed the scope of this article to discuss all of the improvements that are needed to improve the relevance of research for the real world of state governments. Rather, two important issues will be addressed here: using appropriate data and focusing on some of the key subjects that have received inadequate scrutiny.
Data
One of the main limitations of much existing research is the use of inappropriate data. In some cases, this is due to a mistake on the part of the researcher. But, in many situations, the relevant data are somewhat difficult to obtain.
Most studies of state spending and tax policies use data published by the U.S. Census Bureau. Those data are adequate and appropriate for testing many theories, and sometimes they are the only option available. Census data, National Tax Journal Vol 49 no. 2 (June 1996) pp. 273-87 however, are often inappropriate and too dated to be useful for understanding recent developments.
Timeliness is one serious problem. As of March 1996, the most recent information on state finances from the Census Bureau was for fiscal year 1993, which ended in June 1993 for most states.
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For local finances, the most recent data were for fiscal year 1992. Such old information is of limited value in analyzing state and local policies in 1996 because major changes have occurred in the interim. For example, since 1993, the rate of growth of Medicaid spending and federal aid have slowed sharply, states have switched from raising taxes to cutting them, and corrections spending increases have escalated.
Census data have a number of other important shortcomings. Two of the most important are the following:
(1) they aggregate all spending and revenue, failing to distinguish between what is in or out of the general fund; and (2) they do not report Medicaid as a distinct category of expenditures even though Medicaid has been at the heart of state budget policy for a number of years.
The Importance of the General Fund
When governors and legislators battle about the state budget, they usually focus primarily on the general fund, which normally receives the great majority of non-highway-related state tax revenue. In some but not most states, there are also some other important tax-supported funds, particularly for school aid. (1994, 1995) and Blackley and DeBoer (1993) are examples of recent analyses that creatively used NCSL and NASBO reports to analyze state fiscal developments in the early 1990s.
Despite their great value, the NCSL and NASBO reports have some shortcomings that researchers should consider. For example, as already mentioned, states do not employ the same accounting and budgeting systems. A low year-end balance is a sign of unusual fiscal stress in most states, but some states make budget adjustments so that they always report a low balance. In addition, the projections in the reports are often misleading, tending to underestimate National Tax Journal Vol 49 no. 2 (June 1996) pp. 273-87 spending and revenue increases and year-end balances. 16 The information in the reports about periods that have already ended is more useful than the projections. The reporting methodology used by particular states has not always been consistent from year to year, making comparisons across years sometimes unreliable. Finally, the information submitted by states is occasionally influenced by political considerations. In 1993, for example, it was widely believed in Sacramento that California ended the fiscal year with a large deficit, and that is what NCSL reported. Governor Pete Wilson's administration, however, reported to NASBO that there was a budget surplus, and that is what it said. Despite such problems, the NCSL and NASBO reports are extremely useful documents on the whole.
Vital Research Subjects
Five subjects are essential for understanding state fiscal policies: whether state budgets are structurally balanced, the factors affecting discretionary tax changes, the determinants of state spending, the interactions between state and local governments, and the effects of federal aid. The first four subjects have received relatively little attention. While the fifth has been studied extensively, it requires more disaggregated research, particularly in relation to Medicaid and block grants in general. These issues are largely the same ones that would need to be studied even if no major devolution occurs. Before one can trace the effects of new federal policies, it is necessary to understand what is already occurring in state policy.
Structural Balance
The analysis of whether state budgets have structural surpluses or deficits can be divided into two parts: How rapidly will revenue from the existing tax system grow? How much will the spending necessary to maintain the current level of services increase?
In many (but not all) states, the income elasticity their state tax systems is lower than it was in the late 1970s, and tax revenue now tends to grow more slowly than total economic activity. Among the reasons for the lower responsiveness of tax revenue to economic growth are the trend toward flatter income tax rates, the adoption of indexing in 17 of the 41 states with income taxes, the movement of more households into the highest bracket of state income taxes, and the increasing economic importance of services, which are lightly taxed by state sales taxes. Unfortunately, there is little good research to document the extent of the reduction of elasticity.
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Well-grounded estimates of elasticity using time-series data need to make adjustments for the effects of legislated changes; such information can be obtained only at the state level.
There are numerous important conceptual issues in analyzing the spending side of the state budget, such as the following.
(1) Is the concern with maintaining current services or complying with current laws? Many recent studies do not really assume current services. Rather, they often extrapolate past trends or assume that policies follow existing legislation, which may permit erosion of service levels or improvements in services. (2) This issue is closely related to the question of whether states with more elastic tax systems tend to have faster growing revenue and spending. From a political point of view, it would seem considerably easier to increase revenue automatically from the nominal growth of income than to increase it by explicitly raising tax rates or expanding the tax base. In fact, however, most studies have found that the proportion of tax revenue from the personal income tax (the proxy usually used to indicate differences in elasticity) has a weak effect on revenue/spending increases or no effect at all. (Oates, 1975; Feenberg and Rosen, 1987) If that is true, it would imply that discretionary tax changes offset differences in the natural growth of revenue in response to economic changes. That would be consistent with the wellestablished fact that states with relatively high personal income tax rates were much more likely to reduce them in the 1980s than states with low income tax rates (Gold, 1991) . But firm conclusions about the effect of the tax system's elasticity on revenue and spending cannot be obtained until good estimates of elasticity are available.
Determinants of Spending
An important area for research would focus on the simultaneous determination of spending for the major parts of the state budget. It is widely believed but not well documented in public finance literature that Medicaid and corrections spending have, to some extent, crowded out spending for education and welfare programs. Moffitt (1990) concluded that Medicaid has crowded out welfare spending, and Wyckoff and Fossett (1996) found an impact of Medicaid on school aid, but much further research is needed along these lines. Neither of those studies took a general approach that considered all of the major budget categories, recognizing that, if more is spent on one program, less can be devoted to others.
Most research has focused on determinants of state and local spending. While that is important from some perspectives, it is also important to analyze state and local spending separately because decisions are often made independently at the two levels.
Interactions between State and Local Governments
Aside An important priority for future research should be the effects of devolving state programs to local governments. In view of the substantial variation that already exists among states, it should be possible to provide useful guidance to state policy makers about how to devolve programs without creating more problems than are solved.
Effects of Federal Aid
A vast amount of research has been done on the effects of federal aid on state and local spending. Little of it extends into the period from 1989-93 when federal aid soared. Little of it deals with Medicaid, which, as mentioned above, now accounts for approximately 40 percent of the total amount of aid provided. Much of the research is relatively highly aggregated, making it impossible to measure with precision the effect of differing matching ratios.
Welfare is one program that has been analyzed extensively. According to Chernick and Reschovsky's review of the literature (1995) , it has been difficult if not impossible to separate the price effects of aid from the income effects because a state's matching rate depends on its per capita income. Considerable difference exists between two bodies of research, with one group of studies finding much larger price effects than the other. This issue would be extremely important if the federal government converted welfare to a block grant, which would sharply increase the price of spending on welfare from the state budget point of view. While the literature agrees that block grants would tend to depress welfare spending to some degree, the so-called "race to the bottom" would be much faster according to some researchers than others.
The Importance of Disaggregation
One of the underlying themes of this section is the importance of disaggregation. For example, various states must be considered separately because states are not monolithic in their policies, what the Census Bureau calls welfare spending must be divided between Medicaid and cash assistance, individual spending programs must be considered to understand the effects of federal matching provisions, revenue from charges must be considered separately from miscellaneous revenue, and states must be analyzed distinctly from local governments.
The reference to local governments requires elaboration. Many of the points made here about the need for research on states apply to local governments as well. There is far less research on the fiscal behavior of counties-the fastest growing general governments in the country-than on states. From some perspectives, it is important to consider state and local policies rather than those of states or localities alone. We need both kinds of analyses-those that examine state and local governments separately and those that study them together.
Issues Raised Specifically by Devolution
Much of the research on devolution can be divided into four important areas.
(1) Responsiveness to price changes. How much will spending decrease if block grants substitute for matching grants?
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(2) Diversity of demands. How much will the variation in spending among states increase? If the federal government has caused spending to rise to a much higher level than citizens of some states desire, differences in the level of spending could grow considerably. Among the factors influencing these changes will be the effect of relaxing mandates on service levels, differences in matching rates, and possible differences in the elasticity of demand for services. (3) Diversity of production technology.
If the federal government allows greater freedom to design programs, there should also be increased variation in how states structure and operate the delivery of services. (4) Distributional effects. If the federal government eliminates the national safety net, there could be a significant increase in inequality in terms of income and services received.
In analyzing these effects, analysts should be careful to avoid the pitfall of placing too much emphasis on policies adopted in the one or two years after devolution goes into effect. The initial state response may be muted because of inertia or by reserves that can be tapped during a transition period. The long-run effects of devolution are likely to be much greater than its short-run results.
THE CONTEXT OF THE DEVOLUTION REVOLUTION
Research about the impact of the New Federalism has to consider the context in which it is occurring. State policies are already changing. One of the problems with studying states is that there are long-term trends and intermediate-term trends, and one's sense of the direction of change depends on the time period one considers. For example , consider the following.
(1) State taxes rose much faster than local taxes in the quarter century from 1970-95, but that is entirely because of what happened in the 1970s. Since 1985, local taxes have risen faster. (2) Likewise, states now pay a considerably higher share of the cost of elementary and secondary education than they did in 1970, but since 1987, the state share has been trending downward. (3) States are much more dependent on personal income taxes than they were in 1970, but in the past decade, the average effective income tax rate has not risen. (4) Reliance on the property tax fell sharply in the 1970s, but since 1982, the property tax has rebounded, growing faster than personal income (although it still claims a much lower proportion of income than it did 25 years ago).
If one is predicting what will happen in the next five or ten years, the trends since the mid-1980s seem more significant than the longer-term trends going back to 1970. What, then has been happening to spending and tax policy? Let us consider spending first. Table 1 shows that some important changes occurred in the composition of state spending between 1990-94:
Expenditures
(1) Medicaid rose most, growing from 9.1 percent to 12.8 percent of the budget. Among the causes of this increase were health cost inflation, National Tax Journal Vol 49 no. 2 (June 1996) pp. 273-87 the impact of the recession in raising caseloads, and the shifting of other health programs into Medicaid.
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(2) Corrections also rose sharply, from 5.2 percent to 5.9 percent of total spending, reflecting popular support for "get tough on criminals" policies such as "three strikes and you're in." (3) School aid, the largest share of the budget, was stable at about 36 percent of the total. This was not a strong performance considering that schools had to contend with large enrollment increases during this period. 19 Competition from Medicaid and corrections is probably an important reason why school aid did not increase more. After the recession ended, real spending per pupil, including federal and local funds, rose much less than in other nonrecession periods during the past 50 years. (4 On another level, spending may be undergoing changes in response to the "reinventing government" movement, which can be viewed as attempting to change the production function for government services, or at least moving up to the production function from an inefficient position away from it. To the extent that this movement succeeds, lower spending may not imply reduced services. (Gold, 1996) .
It may be, however, that state tax policy is in the process of becoming more conservative. At least, that is the impression one gains from shifts in the political ideologies of many recently elected governors and legislators.
This issue is unsettled because not many proponents of tax cuts also explicitly call for large reductions in services. They usually claim that services can be maintained by increasing efficiency, or they gloss over the issue. But attitudinal surveys usually find that, while citizens like tax cuts, they do not want to lose services.
Recent experience suggests that tax cuts will tend to occur in states with relatively high tax rates and relatively elastic tax systems. The cut in high-tax states reflects the intense competition for economic development that is an important part of the environment for making state fiscal policy.
Conclusions
If the New Federalism is adopted in something like the form proposed by Congressional Republicans, the country will be in for a grand experiment. In some important ways, state governments have changed fundamentally. Starting in the 1960s, they became more representative, more competent, and much larger. If the federal government pulls back sharply, there is no precedent for telling how the states will respond.
The problem of predicting their response is complicated by some other factors. Twenty-one states now have term limits for legislators. While the effects of these newly enacted limitations are still uncertain, they are likely to reduce expertise, increase the shortterm orientation of policy making, and enhance prospects for adoption of new, untested policies. In addition, nearly half of the states have constitutional or statutory spending or revenue limits that did not exist 20 years ago. Since most of those limitations make no allowance for changes in federal aid, they could present formidable barriers to state efforts to offset reduced reliance on federal aid.
The New Federalism promises to present great opportunities for public finance researchers. But if they are to take advantage of it, they will have to be more creative about obtaining data and pay more attention to institutional details than they have in the past. In many states, the balanced budget requirement requires that a balanced budget be enacted, but if the budget falls into deficit during the course of the year, that is acceptable. All states do, however, attempt to eliminate deficits quickly. 8 That was the conclusion about the block grants created in 1981 according to Peterson et al. (1986) . 9 At first, states used donations from hospitals to provide their matching funds and then returned the funds to the hospitals as Medicaid reimbursements. A variation was to impose a tax on health care providers, which sometimes needed to be paid only if the provider agreed. Some of these taxes guaranteed that the provider would receive at least as much back from the state as it paid in tax. When donations were outlawed and the federal government required that hospital taxes not have "hold harmless" provisions, some states turned to intergovernmental transfers, which were like donations, except that they came from local government hospitals or university medical facilities. All of these devices allowed states to painlessly obtain more federal aid without spending any regular tax money. Another strategy was to convert a health program that was formerly funded completely by state revenue into part of the Medicaid program, thereby obtaining federal support for at least half of the cost. 10 The fiscal year ends March 31 in New York, August 31 in Texas, and October 31 in Alabama and Michigan. 11 There are no national figures for interest spending in general funds, but Maryland's situation is illustrative. Its general fund interest outlays are less than 1 percent of the total, while interest accounts for more than 4 percent of general spending reported by the Census Bureau. 12 During the 1980s, such activities led to rapid increases in both interest outlays and interest earnings, making it appear as if the reach of government was growing more rapidly than was true for core activities. Much of the growth of interest revenue, for example, was not available for funding regular programs because it was balanced by higher interest expenses. 13 Between 1990-92, for example, the proportion of state (i.e., nonfederal) Medicaid dollars obtained outside of the general fund rose from 5-19.9 percent. 14 The National Income and Product Accounts do not provide a satisfactory alternative. Although they are much more timely than Census data, they are even more highly aggregated, both in terms of spending functions and in that they combine state and local governments. 15 Both NCSL and NASBO publish reports on forecasts of general fund spending and revenue and yearend balances as well as estimates of those indicators for the most recently completed year. Their coverage otherwise differs, providing complementary features. NCSL publishes projections of spending increases for five major spending categories, and its compilation of legislated tax changes is more detailed and accurate. NASBO reports spending in the two most recently completed years, enabling it to incorporate later revisions than NCSL. In addition, NASBO publishes a report on state spending that shows outlays for the three past years for the major categories of spending, dividing it between general fund, other state funds, federal aid, and bonding. 16 These biases tend to exist when the economy is expanding. When a recession occurs, revenue and balances generally are lower than projected. Spending is higher for some programs but lower for others. 17 The first two reasons why elasticity has fallen relate to one-time changes, while the second two refer to continuing developments. For a review of what state revenue officials believe about the elasticity of their tax systems and a review of the literature, see Gold (1995b) . 18 No reliable data are available to measure how much health spending was shifted into Medicaid. The spending considered here is the sum of National Tax Journal Vol 49 no. 2 (June 1996) pp. 273-87 general fund spending plus earmarked state spending for elementary and secondary schools. This is a rough approximation of how tax dollars are spent, except that it excludes most highwayrelated spending. It excludes spending paid for with federal aid, user charges, or the special devices used to help finance Medicaid. 19 Enrollment rose 6.9 percent during this period, the largest increase since school enrollment peaked in 1973. This was, of course, much less than the increases in welfare caseloads, Medicaid rolls, and prison populations.
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